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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, REASON, AND
REVELATION IN TWO CLASSICAL
HINDU THEOLOGIES
Francis X. Clooney, S.J.

This essay introduces central features of classical Hindu reflection on the existence and nature of God by examining arguments presented in the
Nyayamaiijarl of Jayanta Bhatta (9th century CE), and the Nyayasiddhaiijana
of Vedanta Desika (14th century CE). Jayanta represents the Nyaya school of
Hindu logic and philosophical theology, which argued that God's existence
could be known by a form of the cosmological argument. Vedanta Desika represents the Vedanta theological tradition, which denied that God's existence
could be known by reason, gave primacy to the revelatory texts known as the
Upanii;>ads, and firmly subordinated theological reasoning to the acceptance of
revelation. Jayanta and Desika are respected representatives of their traditions
whose clear, systematic positions illumine traditional Hindu understandings of
"God" and the traditional Hindu debates about Cod's existence and nature.
Attention to their positions highlights striking common features shared by
Hindu and Christian theologies, and offers a substantial basis for comparative
reflection on the Christian understanding of God's existence and nature, and
the roles of reason and revelation in knowledge of God.

The Arrival of the Question of God as a Subject of Debate ill Hindu India
Before turning to Jayanta Bhatta and Vedanta Desika, it is important
first to understand how the existence and nature of God became an urgent
question in India. Let us therefore first consider a few features of the intellectual climate in which the Nyaya and Vedanta theologians (henceforth,
respectively, the Naiyayikas and Vedantins) had to expound their views
on God. Nyaya and Vedanta theologies and arguments about the existence
of God develop within a complex religious environment which had as its
most prominent established feature a worldview rooted in the authority of
the Sanskrit-language Vedas and the ritual practices closely connected with
the Veda. In the ritually-described world of the Vedas, many gods were
recognized and invoked and no one god could be said to reign supreme
and unchallenged. In this environment, two challenges to the tradition
were key in helping to provoke explicit debate about the existence of God,
one theistic and the other its opposite.
On the one side there was the persistent and growing tendency in the
wider Hindu culture, popular and intellectual, toward theism and even de
facto monotheism, in particular the worship of major deities such as Siva
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and Vi!?l).u (who was worshipped as Rama and Kr!?l).a in particular). Even
as the older pantheon of gods related to the Vedic rituals lost favor, at least
in the wider popular imagination, these new major deities were increasingly figures of substance, whom intellectuals had to take into account. The
issue was not solely the achievement of a higher or more refined religious
discourse. The ritual system itself was highly sophisticated, while a key
alternative to the primacy of ritual practice had already developed in the
Vedic tradition, i.e., in the Upani!?adic discovery of brahman as the pervasive spiritual power underlying all reality, and of atman as the innermost
self of all living beings; this focus on the Self took a potent intellectual form
in the schools of VedaI}ta, particular with the great theologians Badarayal)a
(5th century CE) and Saqlkara, the articulator of Nondualist Vedanta (7th8th century CE).
In this context where both ritual practice and the discovery of self
would be recognized as coherent and sufficient centers for religious worldviews, it would not be obvious or uncontested that there should be a God
posited at and as the center of religious intelligibility. Yet theism - as the
focus on a single, supreme God - proved itself to be a strong competitor to
the ritual and nondualist alternatives, and texts like the Bhagavad Gfta
(2nd century BCE) stated the case for theism in a compelling fashion.
Intellectual systems like Nyaya and Vedanta - which could function without such theism - nevertheless had to find ways of addressing theistic concerns and incorporating theistic values.
But at the same time this tendency to theistic reconstructions of religion
were counterbalanced by strong forces tending toward atheism or, at least,
rejections of the idea that positing the existence of a supreme God is necessary in order to render the world intelligible. Here, as in many other areas
of Hindu thought, the Buddhist arguments are crucial. Thinkers like
Dignaga and Dharmakrrti brought a wide range of epistemological, logical,
and linguistic issues into sharp focus, and their writings highlighted the
intellectual bases for their fundamental religious concern - the identification of Gautama, the Buddha, as the omniscient, gracious savior. Since the
Buddhist positions are amply discussed elsewhere in this issue of the journal, I will not rehearse them here, and will emphasize only that to understand properly the earlier (pre-l 000 CE) Hindu understandings of God one
must keep in mind the Buddhist critiques of the idea of God and the
Buddhist alternatives to God-language.
The other major strand of critique against explanatory theism and the
project of formulating an induction of God's existence came from within
the orthodox world. The school of ritual analysis and interpretation known
as Mlmaqlsa, which dates back at least to the early centuries BCE, presents
us with an orthodox brahmanical rejection of the idea of a God who is
world-maker and Veda-author. Although the MimalT1sa thinkers (henceforth Mirnaqlsakas) were pragmatists who argued for the intelligibility and
coherence of the ritual worldview and were disinclined to debate cosmological and theological issues, they could not control the discussion about
religious issues in ancient India. In the face of competing candidates for
ultimate religious meaning, they too had to take up and discuss ideas
about God - God as the author of the Vedic scriptures, creator of the
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world, recipient of all worship - even if such issues and the discussion
itself were not really amicable to the Mlmarpsa system. To elude the
advent of a God as the guarantor of meaning, the Mimarpsakas grudgingly
dealt with more extended layers and levels of theological reasoning, taking
up the question of God in a variety of intellectual settings, beginning with
the ritual and linguistic, and continuing to the cosmological and logical. In
all these intellectual contexts, Mimarpsa resisted conceding to theism an
intellectual and explanatory role.
The earliest Mimarpsa position on God was simple disinterest. The
Piirva Mimi'ilpsa SL1tras of Jaimini (2ryd century BCE) and the first commentary on the Siitras, the Bha$ya of Sabara (1st century CE), stand at the
start of the textual tradition of Mimarpsa. They seem to have been largely
uninterested in cosmology and cosmogony and the clarification of metaphysical presuppositions. Neither elaborates a theory about how the world
came to be, and neither addresses the issue of whether there is or needs to
be a God. Jaimini and Sabara give only minimal evidence for what will
become, later on, the developed Mimarpsa position on God. At various
points in the Siitras, however, the claims they do make serve implicitly to
undercut the attribution of substantial reality to either gods or God, by
constructing complete explanations which do not require the postulation of
a Being outside the closed ritual world. Their counterposition was put forward largely in terms of how language works; the coherence of the Vedic
system is justified internally according to the dynamics of language learning and interpretati<;n, such that external appeals are judged unnecessary.
On the basis of Sabara's views there developed two important schools
of Mimarpsa, one traceable to the teachings of Prabhakara Misra (7th-8th
century), and the other to those of Kumarila Bhatta (7th century). Thinkers
in the less influential though perhaps more traditional Prabhakara school
defended the self-sufficiency of sacrifice and the non-necessity of positing a
God largely on linguistic grounds: language-learning is simply a process of
juniors learning from their seniors, and there is no need to posit a maker of
the relationship between words and meanings; analogously, there is no
need to posit a world-maker.
In the more dominant school of Kumarila Bhatta, the non-theistic position is developed on linguistic grounds and also in regard to cosmological
issues. In elucidating Sabara's commenta}"y on Jaimini's siitra 1.1.5,
Kumarila devotes a series of sections of his Slokavartika to topics directly
or indirectly related to language, word, and referent. He engages a series of
positions - including Buddhist arguments - which threaten the
Mimarpsa understanding of linguistic reference and the nature of reality
(the referent). He defends Mimarpsa's realist understanding of the world
as a self-sufficient whole.
In a key section known as the Sambandhak$epaparihara ("The deflection of the criticisms of the [innate] relationship [between words and meanings]"), Kumarila refutes the view that the word-meaning relation is conventional. He seeks to show that there is no convincing way to explain the
beginning of that relationship; rather, it is simply given, knowable and
usable, without having been created by any particular maker. Kumarila
devotes the middle part of the Sambandhak$epaparihara to refuting the
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idea of a supreme God, since such a God, were one to exist, would also be
the prime candidate for the roles of guarantor of language in general and
of composer of the Vedic scriptures in particular. But Kumarila rejects the
idea of God also for a series of more philosophical reasons, including these:
a. the idea of a world-maker is not viable, since one cannot conceive how
such a person would make a world, or why; b. the widely accepted idea
that creations and dissolutions are periodic is hard to reconcile with the
idea of a perfect, divine maker - who should have been able to settle things
once and for all; c. the maker of a material world would need a material
body - and therefore would be susceptible to the problems suffered by
material beings, as well as requiring some other maker for that body; d.
systems which posit a higher, controlling consciousness (such as Vedanta
and SalTlkhya) fail to explain how this consciousness could relate to a
changing, finite world. The conclusion for Kumarila, as for all
MlmalTlsakas who took up this line of argument, is that the idea of a maker
is complicated, problematic, and unnecessary. Given their lack of interest
in the project of establishing a Lord, the MimalTlsakas had no interest in
deciding in favor of the credibility of inductions and other arguments supportive of the existence of a God. l
The intellectual context for Nyaya and Vedanta, then, is one in which
there is an impetus toward a theistic reformulation of religion, but also a
tradition of severe critiques of the plausibility and usefulness of positing
the existence of God. The challenge to the Naiyayikas such as Jayanta and
Vedantins such as Vedanta Desika is to formulate positions on God that
are both intellectually and religiously credible. Let us begin with the
Nyaya, first by way of some general considerations, and then by way of
some particular observations on Jayanta Bhatta himself.

God in Early Nyaya Discourse
The early discussions of religious topics in the Nyaya school of logic
were not focused on the question of God; even the oldest Nyaya discussion
of the topic of God, found in the Nyaya Sutras 4.1.19-21, seems only gradually and reluctantly to have been turned into a serious theological discourse about God by commentators. The question is raised in the midst of
a longer consideration, in Books 3 and 4 of the Nyaya Sutras, of the set of
"twelve realities" listed in sutra 1.1.9. The six primary realities (soul, body,
sense-organs, objects of perception, apprehension, mind) are treated in
book 3, while in book 4, the six dependent realities (activity, defect, rebirth,
fruition, pain, release) are examined in detaiJ.2 Nyaya Sutras 4.1.11-43 discuss the topic of the origins of the six dependent realities. In 4.1.11-13 it
was determined that manifest things are generated out of other manifest
things, and then, in 4.1.14-43, eight alternative explanations are considered
and, it seems, rejected: production from a void (siitras 14-18), or by God
(siitras 19-21), or due to chance (siitras 22-24); the notions that all things are
evanescent (sutras 25-28), or eternal (siitras 29-33), or that there is only
diversity (siitras 34-36), or that nothing exists (siitras 37-40), or that the
exact number of things can actually be known (siitras 41-43).
Sutras 19-21 contain a terse argument about whether God is required to
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ensure the fruitfulness of human action:
4.1.19 The Lord is the cause, since we see that human action is fruitless.
4.1.20 This is not so since, as a matter of fact, no fruit is accomplished
without human action.
4.1.21 Since that is efficacious, the reason lacks force.
This is the earliest Nyaya treatment of the topic of God; in context, amidst a
series of proposed reasons which are rejected, the point of the obscure 21 st
sutra is most likely to reject the need for a God who will be the guarantor of
the efficacy of human activity. If there is no need for a certain kind of
being, that being should not be introduced, so the suggestion made in
satra 19 has no force. Since human action can be explained without positing a Cod, it is better to avoid this postulate; a more common, empirical
postulate - the contingent arises from the contingent - is sufficient to
account for reality. Satra 21 can thus be interpreted as a criticism of the
postulation of theism, as is clearer in this amplified version:
4.1.21 Since that [action] is efficacious [only due to human effort],
the reason [put forth in 4.1.19, regarding the need to posit a Lord]
lacks force.
But thereafter the situation changes, perhaps due to the need to provide a
more definitive account of how the perceived world began, and perhaps,
as we have seen, due to the rise of theism as a central criterion in the developing Hindu orthodoxy. The Nyaya tradition seems then to change its
apparent argument against God into a defense of God's existence, as the
Nyaya commentators took the argument in the theistic direction. Satra 21
was then interpreted quite differently:
4.1.21 Since that [human effort] is efficacious [only with divine help]'
the reason [put forth in 4.1.20, regarding the idea that a Lord is superfluous] lacks force.
To defend the interconnection between the postulation of Cod and the
practical intelligibility of the world, the Naiyayikas had to develop increasingly complex discussions of Cod's existence, introducing a theistic
explanatory hypothesis into a system that previously was thought to work
neatly without such considerations. At first, the goal was less a defense of
the existence of God than the search for a satisfactory explanation of the
data of ordinary and empirical experience. But once they had seemingly
reluctantly entered upon this debate, the Naiyayikas pursued it with great
vigor, as Jayanta Bhatta's exposition shows.

The Existence and Nature of God according to Jayanta Bhatta's NyayamaiijarP
Tra~dition has it that Jayanta Bhatta lived in Kashmir during the reign of
King Sarp.karavarman, in the 2nd half of the 9th century CE. Jayanta was a
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well-respected !eacher who, according to one old tradition, suffered persecution under Sal11karavarman, and actually wrote his Nyayamaiijarf
("Bouquet of Reasoning" or "Bouquet of Nyaya") while in prison! Little
else is known about Jayanta, and his Nyayamaiijarfhas not received wide
attention even among Nyaya scholars, in part since it was eclipsed by later,
ever more systematic works such as Udayana's Nyayakusumaiijali. But in
the NyayamaiijarI Jayanta offers us an excellent, full exposition of the key
questions related to God as seen from the Nyaya point of view. Although it
follows the order of the oldest Nyaya text, the Nyaya Satras, and thus
resembles a commentary, the individual sections of the Nyayamaiijarf are
complete treatments of topics selected from the Satras. Part One of the
NyayamaiijarI considers the means of right knowledge (pramal)a), with an
emphasis on the nature, kinds, and epistemological value of perception,
induction, and verbal communication. In this context a range of epistemological and theological issues are treated. Part Two analyzes both the
objects of right knowledge (prameya) and also the rhetorical strategies useful in valid argumentation, as well as the flaws in argumentation to be
avoided. The discussion of whether there is a God (Lord, Isvara)5 is found
in Part One, in the course of the discussion of the authority underlying verbal - and scriptural - testimony. Jayanta adheres to a realist view of the
world and a theological view which allows for definite, reasoned statements about God. The world is real but finite, so it requires some explanation; God is knowable at least insofar as he is the world-cause; upon consideration, some further attributes are necessarily included in this minimal
definition of God as world-maker.
Jayanta begins his discussion of the existence of God by listing a series
of objections to the theistic position, which can be summarized as ten: i.
God cannot be perceived; ii. therefore, God cannot be known based on a
specific or general inference drawn from something perceived;6 iii. the
earth is not "something made," an effect; iv. there is no need to postulate a
maker beyond all the various causes; v. a maker must have a body, and so
would suffer the various limitations that bodies impose; vi. it cannot be
shown that there is just one maker; vii. it is not possible to imagine a purpose for God's making the world; if God has made this unhappy world
simply because he wanted to, he is cruel, and beings are subject to divine
whims; viii. if there is a determining divine will which is not subordinate
to rules, the merits and demerits of beings will not necessarily matter (as
they would if reward and punishment were a matter only of cause and
effect), and even liberation might not be permanent since this God could
reverse it; ix. just as perception and ind uction therefore do not work, so too
other possible sources of authoritative knowledge (e.g., verbal testimony
[sabdal and comparison [upamana]), do not succeed in making known the
existence of God; x. popular beliefs are surely no basis on which to claim
certainty regarding God's existence. 7 Except for the first and the last, these
arguments are aimed at problematizing induction and undercutting the
likelihood of drawing any definite conclusions about God by induction. Vii
and viii mark special problems on the basis of which the fact of a God
known by induction would lead to new and difficult questions, and most
of Jayanta's defense is aimed at showing that induction does work.
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When Jayanta takes up and systematizes the Nyaya argumentation
about God in the third part of the Nyayamaiijarl - the section on verbal
knowledge - he mentions three opposing groups by name: the mat~rialists
(Carvakas), the ritual theorists (Mlmarnsakas), and the Buddhists (Sakyas).
According to Jayanta, the materialist goal is to undercut the Veda by denying that it is eternal and by positing instead that it has merely human
authors, while yet also arging that the world, though finite, has no maker.
Like other scholars who mention the materialists, Jayanta deals with them
only briefly. He charges them with inconsistency: either the Veda and the
world both have agents behind them (as Nyaya prefers), or neither does; if
the Veda has an author, then so too the world should have a maker.
The second group of Jayanta's named opponents are the Mlmarnsakas
who, as we have seen, were orthodox ritual theorists. They were vehement
opponents of both the Carvakas and Buddhists but also, since their system
requires no God or world-maker, key opponents of the Naiyayikas too. As
Jayanta presents their position in this context, their quarrel is with the idea
of establishing the world as an "effect" depending on some particular
cause. Jayanta rejects their view by arguing that if the world is perishable as it evidently is - one must also admit its status as an "effect" in need of a
cause.' Jayanta rightly recognizes that the challenge posed by the
Mimarnsakas raises problems similar to those raised by the materialists
and the Buddhists, though with Mlmarnsa there is the added weight of the
charge that one need not posit a God even to be a good, orthodox Hindu.
Third, Jayanta introduces the Buddhists as those who deny that the term
"effect" ("something made") is appropriately applied to what we observe
around us. The word "world" is just a label superimposed on the flux of
reality, without telling us anything important about that reality." Against
their views Jayanta must argue in favor of the possibility of real reference
for terms like "world" and "effect," while also presenting a persuasive case
for identifying causes based on the recognition of effects.
Against these three opposing perspectives and in response to the ten
objections listed above, Jayanta's primary challenge is to show how it is
possible to affirm that there is a God who is the guarantor of the Veda and
maker of the world. Since the Veda was a universally accepted source of
knowledge, and since God is not actually perceived, neither perception nor
a specific induction from perception proves anything. If God is to be
known, then, God's existence has to be established by a more general
induction, based on noticing the pattern of things as they usually occur
and on making a judgment about a particular case which exemplifies a
general rule. Thus, "things that are temporary are things that are made,
and we can assume that such artifacts have makers." The major part of
Jayanta's presentation on God is devoted to getting this general induction
straight and establishing that it does afford certain knowledge that there is
a God. Since the world is ever changing and evidently not permanent, it
requires a maker with the proper characteristics, and this maker we name
"God." Jayanta likewise aims at warding off proposed counterexamples
which would undercut the induction by showing that "making the world"
and "being maker of the world" are not like "making a pot" or "being a
pot-maker, potter."
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Much of the debate proceeds according to a lively sense of the relative
weakness and strengths of particular inductions, the possibility of exceptions and alternate explanations. He says that if an induction is strengthened by pointing to analogies with other inductions that are not controversial, the adduced analogous cases do not have to be exact. Smoke on a hill
usually indicates a fire, but not always; a clay pot is obviously made by the
potter, but one cannot say that everything made of day has a maker. Thus,
an ant-hill is made of day, but there is no single maker for the hill, rather
only the contributing actions of many ants. Some things, even if finite, have
no evident makers; no one argues that the generation of a sprout from a
seed is caused by an intervening maker. So too, some very large things,
such as mountains, ought not to be counted as "made" in the same sense
that pots are made. The claim that the world is made is itself controversial,
since "world" is not a dearly named single referent known from experience in the way "pot" is known.
At the heart of Jayanta's response is his insistence that, variables not withstanding, induction remains epistemically informative. Of course, no
observed event - e.g., the production of an effect - is identical to another,
and questions inevitably arise about the appropriateness of any particular
induction drawn on an analogy with some other, easier induction.
Nevertheless, the fundamental plausibility of an induction is undercut only
if it can be shown that the differences between cases - e.g., between making
a pot and making the world - are so great as to deprive the novel induction
of all plausibility. If any observed difference would serve to defeat an induction, then the very practice of induction would become impossible. While the
inductively known world-maker is not exactly the same as a pot-maker,
nothing we learn from the comparison essentially undercuts the idea of a
world-maker or suggests some other, better way of explaining the world. In
Jayanta's view, the underlying insight stands firm: the world is something
made; things that are made require makers; the world has a maker; this
maker is what we mean when we say there is a God.1O
Specifically, then, his responses to the ten criticisms of explanatory theism (stated above) are as follows:
i. Criticism: God cannot be perceived; response: true, God cannot be perceived;
ii. Criticism: therefore, God cannot be inferred based on perception;
response: it is true that God cannot be inferred specifically on the
basis of some specific perception, but God can be inferred on a
more general basis;
iii. Criticism: the earth is not "something made;" response: materialists,
MImaqlsakas, and Buddhists all agree, in other contexts, that
things are impermanent; but things that are impermanent are
made - by some maker;
iv. Criticism: there is no need to postulate a maker beyond all the various
causes; response: whatever the various causes, there still must be
an intelligent maker;
v. Criticism: a maker must have a body, and so would suffer the various limitations that bodies impose; response: there is no need to infer an
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embodied maker; we can say that God makes though not embodied, just as the self guides the body without being embodied;
vi. Criticism: it cannot be shown that there is just one maker; response: a
hypothesis asserting that there is more than one God would be
confusing, since these 'Gods' would be in competition, etc.;
vii. Criticism: it is not possible to imagine a purpose for God's making the
world; response: he makes out of compassion, or out of divine play;
viii. Criticism: the merits and demerits of beings may no longer matter, and
liberation mayor may not be permanent; response: none of this is a
problem, since the integrity of the working of dharma can be
coherently shown to depend on the work of God;
ix. Criticism: just as perception and induction therefore do not work, there
are no other authoritative means of knowledge; [apparent response:
induction does work and does suffice].
x. Criticism: popular beliefs are surely no basis on which to claim certainty
regarding God's existence; [apparent response: this is true).!'
Like other Naiyayikas, Jayanta thinks that observation of the world, and
the requirement that one explain the origins of the world, are legitimate
starting points for an inferential knowledge of God. The defense of the viability of inference - induction - is also a defense of a fundamental analogous knowledge of God. This knowledge is minimal but, as we shall see in
the next section, indicative of certain claims about the nature of God.

The Nature of God according to the Nyayamaiijan
Although the argumentative context of the debate with atheists does not
require Jayanta to develop ideas on the nature of God - that God exists suffices - nevertheless certain claims about the divine nature are implicit in the
argument about God's existence. 12 First, the induction of a world-maker
entails a minimal list of qualities which are essential to any maker (kartr):
intelligence (jiiana), because he must know what is available and how to use
it; will (iccha), because he must have an intention regarding what is to be
done; and effort (prayatna), the ability to act, since the making of things
requires the effort to bring them about. In the course of discussion these
three minimal qualities are shown to be unlimited perfections in the special
case of the world-maker, since it is clear that no ordinary maker would be
capable of making the world. God is omniscient and possessed of a comprehensive and eternally present knowledge, and thus does not need the apparatus of memory. As the world-maker, God must have unrestricted knowledge and power; he cannot have a body, since bodies, as material, are
impermanent, limited, and in need of makers. One can also posit that this
God is never in want and is always satisfied, because he is omnipotent and
always succeeds in whatever he intends and undertakes. It also follows,
Jayanta says, that there can only be one such God, since it would not be possible for there to be several- potentially competing - omnipotent Lords.
Second, once Jayanta has (to his own satisfaction) shown that it is plausible to infer that there is a God who is the maker of the world, he must also
show that it is plausible to claim that this divine maker is the maker of the
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world in which humans actually live - a world that is temporal, contingent, imperfect, a mixture of sadness and joy. He argues against the view
that a perfect maker should have made a perfect world without the possibility of development or decay, by suggesting that there is an important distinction between God's inherent perfection and God's guidance of finite
objects in an imperfect, changing worldY Since God is free and not impelled
to act out of need, when he does act he acts in play, or out of compassion.
Jayanta also addresses objections related to the expectation that the merits and demerits of conscious beings - karma - form the only reliable
basis on which to account for the world morally, so that an appeal to a
deity would interfere with religious and moral probity.14 This issue also
arises in Vedanta, for there too the omnipotence of God has to be balanced
with a respect for the invariable advance of the karmic process. In both
Nyaya and Vedanta the solution is similar, as the moral order is simply
designated to function as in the older non-theistic tradition, but now
dependent on God's will. This is a divine choice which indicates neither
divine subordination to a higher law nor capricious disregard for karma.
Third, Jayanta's argument in favor of God's existence is part of his wider
quest to establish and defend the authority of the Veda in the context of
broader cosmic intelligibility. After he has established the induction in the
3rd part of the NyayamaiijarI and thus determined that there is a God who
can be the author of the Veda, in the 4th part he goes on to discount competing rationales in explanation of the authority of the Veda, and states that the
same Lord who is the maker of the world is also the author of the Veda.
This is known by much the same inferential reasons: words and combinations of words are impermanent and require some maker who synthesizes
them and makes them reliable tools for coherent speech. It also makes no
sense merely to postulate that the world has one maker while the Veda has
another maker, nor to suggest that there are numerous makers all working
in harmony composing the Veda. It is more economical to say that both the
world and the Veda are made by the same maker, the Lord. 15
Fourth, since Jayanta recognizes the authority of the Veda but does not
claim that it is the only basis for deciding that there is a God, he denies that it
is a circular argument to claim that God is the author of the Veda and that
the Veda gives reliable information about God. Those who admit the reasonability of the theistic position and the reasonability of the idea of an authoritative textual tradition expect to find in the Vedic scriptures reinforcement
for what is kllOwn about God rationally. In accordance with his religious
"realism" and view that there is a God who is real (and really "outside" the
text), Jayanta disagrees with the Mlmarpsa view that the Vedas only give
information leading to the proper performance of rituals; rather, the Veda
also gives reliable information on various topics, including God. 16
Fifth, if we can j~dge from the clues Jayanta giyes us, it seems that he is
an adherent of the Saiva tradition of devotion to Siva as supreme Lord. At
the beginning of the NyayamapjarI ~e makes a customary obeisance to
God - and addresses God as Siva (Sambhu, Bhava), along with his consort Parvau, and Ganesa (usually taken as their child):
Salutations to Sambhu, the self composed of eternal bliss, conscious-
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ness and lordship, who by his simple intent creates everything from
the inanimate to Brahma [the creator god];
I bow down to the wife of Bhava whose hair is adorned bv the crescent of the moon and who is verily the river of nectar, the ';xtinguisher of the burning due to existence,
I tender my salutation to the lord of hosts Ganesa whose feet are illumined by the rays of the jewels on the foreheads of gods and
demons, and who is the sun removing the darkness of obstacles. 17
At the end of his defense of theism in part 3 of the Nyiiyamafijarihe says,
Reverence to the one by whose will alone the worlds arise and
endure and dissolve at the end of the age, who distributes among all
creatures the experie~ce of the fruits of their actions, who is eternally
awake and joyful- Siva. 1B
It is thus reasonable to assume that Jayanta belongs to a Saiva tradition,
even if the bulk of the Nyayamafijari is neutral with respect to sectarian
affiliation and potentially inclusive of a variety of sectarian positions. His
logical analysis contributes to piety by undergirding the plausibility of
faith and by ruling out competing theories of the nature of the world or
religious traditions. In his system faith and reason are independent but
mutually supportive, reaching compatible, complementary conclusions.
Sixth, an interesting corollary of the preceding two points is that the several Vedas and various traditional texts are therefore recognized to be in
harmony, except if there is some reason which compels one to rule out a
particular sectarian text as unacceptable. As in other orthodox schools, most
notably MnnaIpsa, the criteria for acceptance or rejection pertain primarily
to orthopraxis or, at least, to whether or not a tradition is inimical to Vedic
orthopraxis. Traditions are not excluded on the basis of wrong ideas or theories about the nature of God but in terms of the behavior that accompanies
the ideas. According to Jayanta's explanation, the behavior at issue is social
and moral. Although Buddhist texts are excluded from the canon of those
which merit respect, the exclusion is argued not on doctrinal grounds but
due to practical moral complaints against Buddhists. In general, Jayanta's
Nyaya is strikingly inclusive: agreeing that there is a God does not commit
one to a particular naming of God nor to some particular form of worship.
Further specifications of the divine identity cannot be achieved by reasoning alone. But as we shall now see, although Vedanta too adheres to a view
of God that is founded in reason and in scripture, the dynamics of this
knowledge of God work out differently there and distinctions arise.

The Existence and Nature of God in Vedanta Desika's Nyliyasiddhaiijana 19
In regard to the doctrine of God, the most notable ally and competitor of
Nyaya in the Sanskrit language traditions are the theistic schools of
Vedanta. 2o Vedanta Desika (1268-1369) was an important theologian of the
Visif?tadvaita. This school of Vedanta roots its theology in the teachings of
the 11th century theologian Ramanuja, whose theology is in turn explicitly
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rooted in the Upani~ads, the Bhagavad Gfta, the Uttara MImaIJIsa Sutras,
etc., and implicitly in the Tamil-language devotional songs of the 7th-9th
century saints known as the alvars. Ramanuja's Vedanta is known as the
Visi~tadvaita or uQualified-Nondualist" Vedanta since, unlike the strict
nondualist position of the Advaita (UNondualist") School, it insisted on the
distinct and enduring reality of sentient and insentient beings within
Brahman, the Lord.
Vedanta Desika was born in the town of Tuppil, near Conjeevaram
(today's Kanchipuram) which was a great center of learning for several
religious traditions. Writing in Sanskrit, Tamil, and a mixture of the two,
and composing independe~t treatises, commentaries, and songs, Desika
expounded the faith of the Srivai~r:tavas, that there is o~e ultimate reality,
who is the Lord Narayar:ta (Vif?r:tu)21 with the Goddess Sri, and who at the
same time is Brahman, the Reality described in the ancient Upani~ads.
Two of Desika's treatises, the Nyayaparisuddhi (The Purifying of
Reasoning, 1324) and Nyayasiddhaiijana (The Healing of Reasoning; 1334-5),
together comprise a thorough defense of the Visi~tadvaita system of
Vedanta according to the norms of a rational discourse he shared with the
Naiyayikas. In the Nyayaparisuddhi, Vedanta Desika takes up the topics
of the Nyaya Sutras and discusses four primary means of correct knowledge (pramaIJa): perception (pratyak?a), induction (anumana), verbal
knowledge (sabda), and tradition (smrtl).
The Nyayasiddhaiijana builds on the corrective work of the
Nyayaparisuddhi by focusing on the objects of right knowledge (prameya)
and considering seven topics: i. inert material reality (jac;la dravya); ii. the
individual, dependent self (jIva); iii. the supreme Lord (Isvara); iv. the eternal spiritual/material abode of the Lord (vaikuIJtha); v. understanding
(buddhl); vi. that knowledge which is essential to conscious beings and not
adventitious (dharmabhutajiiana); vii. qualities, which are real but not
material (adravya).22 Our examination of DeSika's work will highlight two
points: first, the rationale for and implications of his (and Vedanta's general) objection to the induction of God's existence, and second, his description of God compared and contrasted with Jayanta's.23
The Existence of God According to the lsvarapariccheda" Section of
Vedanta Desika's Nyayasiddhaiijana
U

Desika offers an explanation of his position about God in the third section of the Nyi:Jyasiddhaiijana, a section entitled "I§varapariccheda"
("Delimiting the meaning of 'Lord'.") In the "I§varapariccheda" Desika
sets forth his understanding that there is a single such reality, who is
Narayar:ta, the God of his particular tradition (and some allied traditions);
he defends this view against a series of opposing positions introduced by
way of various objections.
The "Isvarapariccheda" is argumentative, devoted to a defense of the
common but controverted Vedanta positions about the nature of Brahman,
the self, and the world as a single integral reality, and also a defense of
specifically Visi~tadvaita Vedanta themes regarding the nature of Vi~r:tu,
the Lord (= Brahman). Desika is aware that all these points are argued at
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length both inside and beyond Vedanta circles, and he defends them vigorously. Most of these points bear philosophical defense even if, like other
Vedanta theologians, Desika's primary strategy is to insist that the truth of
the Vedic scriptures must be acknowledged first; scripture is the only
source of sure knowledge about God, since the arguments put forward by
the Naiyayikas and others must remain always controverted and can never
provide the required certainty. The Buddhists and Mimarytsakas are right
in questioning the induction, but they are wrong in discarding the idea of
God on that basis. TIle Naiyayikas are right in asserting that there is a God,
but they are wrong in arguing that an induction can make it known with
certainty that God exists. 24 Here is a summary paraphrase of the major
points defended in the "Isvarapariccheda:"
the Lord is everywhere perfect and complete, and not subject to
restrictions such as would specify him mythologically as one of a
series of deities, each possessed of some but not all lordly qualities;
ii. contrary to the view of the Nondualist Vedantins, Brahman (i.e.,
the Lord) is not devoid of qualities that can be expressed in positive language;
111. the material evolute (prime matter) is not merely superimposed
on Brahman in a seeming creative interchange, as some
Nondualists hold in hopes of defending Brahman's changeless
perfection;
,
IV. the nondualist position held by Sarpkara and others is not compatible with the position that Brahman is the material source of
the world;
v. it is not tenable to say that Brahman and the world are both different and non-different, as some Vedantins hold;
vi. the sevenfold position of the Jainas is linguistically complicated
and subtle, but it does not tell us anything decisive about the
nature of the reality to which language refers, a reality which has
objective, definite features;
vii. Brahman is not limited by space, time, or things;
viii. it cannot be proven by in4uction that Brahman is the efficient
cause of the world, as the Saivas hold, while holding in suspension the question of whether Brahman is also its material cause;
ix. contrary to the Nyaya view, it cannot be proven by induction even
that the Lord exists (as the necessary efficient cause of the world);
x. The ~ord is eternally accompanied by his eternal divine consort, Sri:.
i.

Desika had two major disagreements with the Naiyayikas, one suggested
indirectly by iv and viii, and the other directly, by ix. First, a? we see in his
argument against the Nondualists at iv. and against the Saivas at viii.,
Desika did believe that God was the material as well as instrumental cause
of the world, and agreed with the Nondualist Vedantins on this; but
Desika thought that the Nondualists could not properly defend the distinctions. required to invest "making" with meaning; he likewise thought that
the Saivas and Naiyayikas were both wrong in attributing only efficient
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causality to God without also accepting God's material causality (which is
known from the Upanif?ads).
The argument with Nyaya is positioned as subordinate to the debate
about induction. As we see at ix., Desika denies that a necessary divine
causal function, and therefore the divine existence too, can be known conclusively by reasoning. While Jayanta and other Naiyayikas thought that
the Lord's existence - as the required efficient cause could be inductively
known, Desika believed that divine causality - simultaneously efficient
and material - could be known only as a single efficient and material
causality. In order to begin with the belief that God is both the material and
efficient cause, Desika has to undercut the confidence that reasoning, prior
to faith in the Vedic scriptures, gives certain knowledge about God.
Consequently too, he rejects the view that it is reasonable, apart from scripture, to assert that God is the efficient cause of the world.
Desika's critique of the Nyaya induction about God's existence is directed against the later Naiyayika, Udayana, whom he quotes, but the basic
charges are pertinent to Jayanta's position too. 25 For the most part, his
skepticism echoes the earlier Mlmarpsa criticisms mentioned earlier in this
essay. Observation of the nature of the world does not lead to a convincing
induction that there is a world-maker, since a limited and ever-changing
world does not give the impression that it has an omniscient and omnipotent maker as its efficient cause. A perfect God would make a flawless and
perfectly complete world, not the imperfect and gradually evolving world
we actually observe. Nor is it possible to describe just how this alleged perfect maker is supposed to have made the world; were he unlimited in
every way, he would not have the specific and limited knowledge, desire,
and effort required to make this specific world.
Even if one agrees with the Nyaya thinkers that the earth has a cause
because it is clearly something made, one cannot jump to the conclusion
that there is a single maker. There are plausible alternative explanations for
the evolution of non-conscious realities - e.g., simply a series of causes which serve just as well to satisfy the mind, so one is not compelled to conclude that any particular created thing - especially "world" - must depend
on one conscious maker. Even if one were to postulate that things which are
made must have not only causes but also makers, this generalization leaves
one without any specific insight into the nature of a particular world-maker.
It would not even be possible to prove that the maker has perfect knowledge, since even a non-omniscient person, or group of such persons, could
have fashioned so imperfect a world. The only maker the Naiyayikas could
succeed in proving would be one with a body, since the physical world
would be most plausibly explained as made by a physical maker - for
where are there other examples of makers without bodies making material
things? Ultimately, there is no satisfactory way to prove both that this physical universe has a maker who does not have a physical body, and it is only
by a kind of wishful thinking that the Naiyayikas end up with the perfect
maker they argue for. So induction gives no reliable knowledge about God.
One can only speculate on the Nyaya response to Desika's arguments.
Since both the Nyaya and Vedanta thinkers are theists who agree substantially about the nature of God (see below), there is no urgency on the
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Nyaya part to respond to Vedanta in particular. The non-theistic
Mlmal11sakas and Buddhists receive the brunt of the Nyaya attacks, but
certainly many of the same arguments would serve well in response to
yedanta skeptics too. Moreover, if we keep in mind the consonance of
Saiva and Nyaya positions, one can speculate that the Nyaya response
would be to show first that the induction does work, and second that faith
in Siva and trust in reasoning can go together. For a Naiyayika, it is useful
and in keeping with scripture to conclude by reason that there is a God
who is the efficient cause of the world, even if from other sources (such as
scripture) one will want to fill in the portrait of God later on.

The Nature of God according to the Nyayasiddhanjana
In arguing against Nondualists, Buddhists and Jains, and against
other theists who think of God differently (holding for instance that God
is the efficient cause but not the material cause of the world) Desika is
implicitly giving us a great deal of information about this God who is
the source of all, who is perfect, omniscient, the spiritual source of all
things material and spiritual, etc. At the beginning of the "Isvarapariccheda," though, he explicitly identifies eight features of "Lord:" i.
The Lord is ruler over all; ii. he is conscious and all-pervasive in knowing; iii. everything is totally dependent upon him; iv. he is propitiated by
all religious actions and gives all the fruits [accruing to worship]; v. he is
the foundation for everything; vi. he is the generator of all things that
are made; vii. he has all things, other than his own knowledge and own
self, as his body; viii. all that he wishes comes true, due simply to himself. The presupposition seems to be that a being deserving the name
"Lord" must be possessed of these eight features. 26 Although this list
may be original to Desika, each of the eight features is familiar from the
older Visi:;;tadvaita Vedanta understanding of God, already in
Ramanuja's works, and they can be traced to the Upani:;;ads. The features are not fully explained in the "Isvarapariccheda," although their
reasonableness is presupposed.
The list can be filled out a bit by brief further reflection on the doctrinal implications of Desika's arguments with his opponents in the body of
the "Isvarapariccheda:" God is perfect, complete, one Lord, beyond sectarian distinctions such as the trinity of Brahma, Vi:;;DU, and Siva; he is the
aU-encompassing reality who bears all as his own body, yet both conscious and non-conscious realities remain distinct within him; he is the
material and efficient cause of the world; although beyond human comprehension, language is not entirely useless regarding him, and he can, be
spoken of in positive terms; his eternal consort is the Goddess Sri,
Lak:;;ml. In most of these statements, Desika is echoing the beliefs of his
Srlvai:;;Dava community, beliefs elaborated elsewhere in Sanskrit and
Tamil sources. What is distinctive in the Nyayasiddhanjana is the terse,
logical form in which such positions are put forward as defensible on reasonable grounds and as superior, similarly on reasonable grounds, to
competing views.
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In practice, Desika shares a common theistic and even monotheistic
worldview with the Naiyayikas. He agrees with Jayanta that there is one
Lord, a perfect, omniscient being who is the cause of the world, author of the
Vedas, giver of liberation. As we have seen, though, they disagree on the
source of this correct knowledge. For the same reason, Desika is also more
vehemently sectarian than Jayanta who seemed comfortable with the implication that there is a God whose reasonably identified features should be
agreeable to all thinking theists. By contrast, Desika is intent on arguing for a
specific identification of who God is. The first and last of Desika's major
assertions in the "lsvarapariccheda" (after his definition of "Lord") test the
boundary between what is accessible to reason and what is known only by
faith. In the first section, Desika claims that it is true that NarayaDa alone is
the Lord, and not any other sectari~ god; in the last, he states that the Lord
is eternally one ,,\,ith his consort, SrI, who is equal to him, and the world
depends on both SrI and NarayaDa, together. Even in the NyayasiddMiijana,
so reasonable a treatise, such arguments are sectarian in a way that the
Nyaya argwnents generally are not; the assertions reg~rding Vi~l!U go well
beyond the claims Jayanta is willing to make regarding Siva.
It will not be surprising to learn that Desika offers a less inclusive view
of the texts and traditions of other communities than does Jayanta. In the
Nyayaparisuddhi, the companion volume to the Nyayasiddhaiijana,
Desika engages in a discussion of traditions and texts (agamabhJ$c1,
smrtyabha$a) which do not deserve the respect of full authority. He lists
kinds of defective traditions, as marred with lesser or greater moral and
intellectual defects. It is only the important Vai$Dava texts, of course, which
are free of these defects - and therefore only they are truly authoritative in
their teachings on God and the world. 27 Jayanta was willing to respect traditions insofar as they contributed to right moral practice, even if his standard was flexible enough to allow him to exclude the Buddhists, while
downplaying sectarian rivalries among Hindus. Desika ,makes no such
allowances, and calls into question the authority even of Saiva texts; texts
which do not testify to the correct scriptural positions can be shown to be
rationally and even "genealogically" deficient.

Theology and Theologies, Hindu and Comparative
Jayanta Bhatta and Vedanta Desika have much in common regarding
the major characteristics of their portrayals of God, even if they reach this
common ground from opposite directions. Jayanta BhaHa derives his theology, insofar as it is an intellectual project, from an original, minimal claim
that it can be known by induction that God exists; Vedanta Desika sees theology first of all as a reasoned elaboration of what is found in the scriptures. As we have seen, on occasion Jayanta Bhatta the logician is comfortable with citing the Upani~ads, and Vedanta Desika the exegete is a master
of dialectic. In most respects their theological conclusions are the same:
God is ruler over all; he is conscious and all-pervasive in knowing; he has
everything totally dependent on himself; he is propitiated by all religious
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actions and gives all the fruits [of worship]; he is the foundation for all
things; he is the generator of all things that are made; he has all things,
other than his own knowledge and own self as his body; all that he wishes
comes true, due simply to himself. The differences reduce largely to one
important difference regarding the nature of the dependence of the world
on God: since Jayanta does not hold the Vedanta view that God is the
world's material cause, he therefore interprets differently the nature of the
dependence of finite realities on God.
In turn, the difference about causality is presented primarily as having
to do with the sources of knowledge of God and how faith and reasoning
are to be ordered and balanced. The argumentation that has been traced
here in Jayanta Bhatta and Vedanta Desika, with some attention to other
Hindu and Buddhist positions, illumines the sources of knowledge of God
- perception (which both deny), induction (which Jayanta accepts), and
scriptural revelation (which Desika makes the unique source, and which
Jayanta accepts as a source) - and differences regarding what can be
known about God by reason, before revelation, and regarding what might
be known in a "public" discourse not tied to any particular sectarian revelation, and instead as available to all reasoning persons.
Jayanta's position allows for a series of (imperfect) analogies with other
acts of making things and things coming into existence or changing form;
observation of the world as such should give people some idea of the needed maker. Knowledge of God, it seems he would agree, is not entirely
unlike other acts of knowledge, regarding either the object or the process.
Desika seems more inclined to say that we will not "read" our world correctly, and must begin to know God properly by relying on an extraordinary act of revelation. Implicit in his view is that if one begins otherwise,
one can at best do as the Naiyayikas do, but more likely will fall into the
errors of Buddhism, Jainism, and nondual Vedanta. Both Desika and
Jayanta are willing to argue with a whole range of opponents, but Desika,
in the "Isvarapariccheda" and other such texts, adopts a kind of defensive
strategy; since he concedes from the start that he cannot prove to unbelievers what he believes, his point is in part that his opponents cannot prove
their views, nor disprove his, nor show that their positions are more satisfactory than his. Beyond that, he must make a confessional appeal. Jayanta
too is not willing to tolerate extreme positions, such as those of atheists, but
he dismisses these on moral grounds. Likewise, he gives no indication of
expec!ing all good and clear-thinking readers to come to embrace specifically Saiva beliefs.
Jayanta benignly seeks a wide common ground; there is one God who is
the author of all the sacred texts, and these many texts, even if they differ,
can all be acceptable to good people. Desika is willing to concede inklings
of truth in other positions, but ultimately he sees only his own tradition as
possessed of the full and fully coherent version of the truth, and thus has
no room for the idea of a broader common ground in which sectarian truth
issues are simply bracketed.
Theirs are developed theological positions which can be compared in
both structure and content with those of Christian theologians. Noticing
this offers us an opportunity to consider how rational claims about the
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existence of God, along with the minimal set of characteristics which must
be attributed to a world-maker, can further be traced in their affiliations to
the faith, piety, and practices of particular communities. Issues which have
been debated at great length in the Western and Christian contexts - the
proof of God's existence, what can be known about God's nature by reason, the balance between reason and revelation, the benefits and costs of
establishing a rational, common ground for discourse on religious topicshave interesting and highly developed counterparts in other traditions,
where they are articulated in frameworks defined by distinguishing factors
and circumstances. 28 Although important differences among religions e.g., between the Christian and Hindu traditions - remain, it should also
be clear that on many issues of theological and philosophical importance
- pertaining to the nature of induction, the intelligibility of the world, the
attributes of God, the balance between reason and revelation, etc. - the
lines of difference cannot be drawn simply between "the Christian
view(s)" and "the Hindu view(s)," since each issue finds defenders and
critics on both sides of the Hindu-Christian divide. A more complex theological differentiation of theologians and their positions is therefore
required, depending on the particular theological issue involved and how
any particular Hindu or Christian theologian locates himself or herself in
regard to that particular issue. 29

Boston College
NOTES
1. An interesting later case is the position taken by KharyQadeva (17th century CE) in his Bhattad1pika. There, in the course of a very extensive treatment
of the nature of the Vedic gods, Khal)Qadeva explains at length why these gods
are not real beings who "live" outside the ritual and textual realm of the Veda;
but he ends his treatment with an apology, explaining that while it was his task
as a Mlm,lrpsaka to expound such a view, his real refuge is the feet of Kri?rya.
See my essay, "What's a God? The Quest for the Right Understanding of
devat,'i in Brahmanical Ritual Theory (MlmaIJIsa,)" International Journal of
Hindu Studies 1.2 (August, 1997): 337-385.
2. As explained in G. Jha's introductory note to Book 4, The Nyaya Satras
of Gautama with the Bha.!?ya of Vatsyayana and the Vartika of Udyotakara, translated by G. Jha (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), p. 1429.
3. The first part only of the Nyayamaiijari, on the means of right knowledge
(pramaI)a), is available in English translation: Jayanta Bhatta's Nyc'iyamaiijarl
IThe Compendium of Indian Speculative Logic], translated by Janaki Vallabha
Bhattacharyya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978). Wherever possible, I have used
this translation, with minimal adjustments. The Sanskrit edition I have used is
Nyayamaiijarl, edited with notes by Surya Narayarya Sukla (Varanasi:
Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1971,2 volumes; Kashi Sanskrit Series 106).
4. According to J. V. Bhattacharya, in the introduction to his translation of
the pramaI)a portion of the Nyayamaiijarlinto English.
5. God - the Lord, Isvara - is treated as male in both Nyaya and
Vedanta. In their more devotional statements, scholars in both traditions link
him with a Goddess, his divine consort.
6. A specific induction would be, for example, the induction that there
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must be rain clouds, because it is raining; or that it have been raining somewhere upstream, because the water is higher than usual. A general induction
would be, for example, the induction that a pot requires someone to have
made it.
7. These objections can be found on pages 175-17R (Sanskrit), 401-406
(English) of the NyayaymafljarL
8. Two citations indicate that Layanta is familiar with the
Sambandhak$epaparihara section of the SlokaFartika, which we examined
above. One cited text (Fartika 75) argues that the fact of intelligent involvement
in the running of the world does not translate into the view that there is a single, supreme intelligent world-ruler; the other (vartika 113) dismisses the belief
that there must be a creation and a destruction of the whole world, as such.
9. Since the PramaI).avartika is the only Buddhist work which Jayanta
cites, Dharmaklrti is probably his key Buddhist arguing partner. Jayanta cites
vartikas 13-14 from the PramaI).asiddhi section, where the question is whether
the alleged conjunction of parts from which the world is made is really a verbal
construct (as Dharmaklrti prefers), or in fact a reality from which one might
construe a real maker of the world, as the Naiyayikas prefer. See Jackson's
essay elsewhere in this issue.
10. As for the objection that "something made" (karya) already smuggles
in the idea of a maker (kartr) as well as cause (ki"iraI).a), Jayanta insists that the
act of combination is evident, and that the arranger of such a combination is
indeed a true maker. He implies, it seems, that one can legitimately move to
the level of abstraction on which "everything" can be labeled all at once as
impermanent, "something made."
11. These responses can be found in the Sanskrit text, pp. 178-188, and in
the English translation, pp. 406-426. There is no explicit response by Jayanta to
the last two objections; we may preswne that he agrees, without conceding any
detriment to his own position.
12. The following six points are gleaned from Jayanta's treatment of God in
the Clrd section of the NyayamaiijarL which we have been considering, and also
the 4th section, where the authority of religious traditions is examined.
13. God's "will per se is eternal because it is not produced by the contact of
the internal organ with the soul. But it conforms to objects, e.g., at one time the
creation of the universe and at another time the destruction of the universe.
During the interval between the creation of the universe and its destruction,
while the universe persists, the creator of the universe wills that this particular
effect should follow from this particular action. The [divine] effort is a particular specification of his intent." (Sanskrit p. 185; translation, p. 421.)
14. See also, "Evil, Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom: Vedanta's
Theology of Karma," Journal of Religion 69 (1989),530-548.
15. See Sanskrit 218-19; translation 496-7.
16. Jayanta quotes from the Ml11.1~taka, SvetasFatara and Naraya1.la
Upani$ads, and the Bllagavad Gfta, and argues that these texts confirm what
he has elaborated in his rationally derived terminology. One interesting correlation, for instance, is his gloss on the Upani!?adic phrase, "the self whose
desires are true (satyakama), whose intentions are true (satyasarpkalpa), that
self you should try to discover ... " (Chtindogya 8.7.3); he says, "Desire (kama)
here means will (iccha), and intent (samkalpa) means effort (prayatna)." I.e.,
the Upani!?adic terms point to the same reality as the terms reasonably derived
just on the basis of examining what is meant by a "maker."
17. Sanskrit, p. 1, translation, p. 1.
18. Sanskrit, p. 188; translation, p. 426. So too, at the end of part 3, he says,
"Enough of this overly learned talk; this theory of the eternity [of words] must
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be discarded; those who understand reasoning must accept that words are
made; since words are made, their maker is the ancient maker, in whose power
is the fullness of poetic brilliance, and in whose hair is the moon." (Sanskrit, p.
213, translation, p. 483.) At the very end of the entire work, he says,
"Reverence to the one whose splendid hair is like the ten million r,ays of the
moon, who is the wish-filling tree for those who surrender, Sambhu."
(Sanskrit, vol. 2, p. 208)
19. The Nyayasiddhaiijalla has not been translated into English.
Throughout, I use the edition of the Nyayasiddhaiijana which includes the
Ratllapetika of Sri Kanchi Tatcharya and the Saralavisada of Sri
Rangaramanuja (Madras: Ubhaya Vedanta Granthamala, 1976).
20. Though not exclusively: even some writers in the Nondualist Vedanta
tradition make room for a provisional theism and, in some case, for a theism
that is sublated only in the final, irreversible unification of all reality. The 16th
century Advaita Dipika of Nrsiqlhasramin is an excellent example in this
regard; its third part incorporates close analyses of theistic language, especially
from the Vai:;;I).ava tradition.
21. Although the historical sources for: the cults of NarayaI).a and Vi:;;I).u
would differ, the piety and theology of the Srlvai:;;I).avas identify the two.
22. The three constituents of reality, lucidity (sattva), passion (rajas), inertia
(tamas); the five senses, conjunction (salllyoga), and potency (saktl).
23. Other "Yorks of Desika, such as the Paramatabhanga (The Breaking of
Other Views), Srimadrahasyatrayasara (The Esst'nce of tlze Three Mysteries), and
most importantly the Tattvamuktakalapa (The Necklace of Complete Truth), consider the same topics (including the nahlre of the Lord as Ultimate Reality), but
the focus on logical issues evident in the Nyi'iyaparisuddhi and
Nyayasiddhaiijana gives this pair of works a clear and systematic shape.
24. An extended <;ritique of the Nyaya induction of God's existence is
found in Ramanuja's Sribha~ya, section 1.1.3; for a translation, see The Vedanta
SOtras with the Commentary of Ramalluja, translated by G. Thibaut, Sacred
Books of the East, volume 48 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976).
25. Sanskrit, pp. 325-357.
26. All things are the Lord's body, because the body and soul relationship
is the best metaphor or analogy available to understand the mysterious interconnection between the Maker, who is both the efficient and material cause of
the world, and the world itself. To say that all his wishes come true is to affirm
that the Lord is capable of volition, and it is also to ward off the implication
that the Lord is subject to desire, or experiences need, or suffers from only partial fulfillment of his wishes, etc.
27. Nyayaparisuddhi, Sanskrit, pp. 226-229.
28. But even if these are two very important theologians, their works cannot be taken as representing the full range of Hindu theological positions. I
conclude by indicating just two of the ways in which the materials presented
here need to be complemented. First, of course, the complexities of Nyaya and
Vi:;;i:;;tadvaita Vedanta deserve fuller treatment, even with respect to the works
of Jayanta and Desika, and then also with respect to other significant figures in
each school. Second, even if we stay with systems that are properly theistic
(and thereby exclude systems such as Mimaqlsa and Advaita Vedanta which
hold for some transcendent realities or values, but not for a God), there are
comparable theological systems which deserve attention and which would
introduce positions l?oth interestingly similar and interestingly different. For
instance, there is the Saiva Siddhanta tradition, which we looked at briefly, and
also Madhva's so-called Dualist (Dvaita) Vedanta, which takes one step further
some of the theistic claims made by Desika. Third, and here too excluding a
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wide range of materials - in the epics, in poetry, art, etc. - which certainly
implies specific theologies but does not formulate them as such - special
attention is due to the Goddess traditions, even in schools such as Vedanta but
particularly in Tantric traditions, wherein full understandings of the Goddess
are articulated, though not in the same way, nor with the same standard questions adopted by both Jayanta and Desika. How Goddess theology is articulated is a project which is important for a more complete understanding of Hindu
thinking about the divine. But even those alternative discourses now function
only in a wider context in which the Nyaya positions and the supporting and
critical positions of others in response to Nyaya dominate the Hindu discourse
on God.
29. On the comparative theological implications of the Nyaya reasoning
about God, see also my essay, liThe Interreligious Dimension of Reasoning
about God's Existence," International journal for Philosophy of Religion 46:1-16,
1999.

